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Streamlining Deportation Proceedings:
Self-Incrimination, Immunity from
Prosecution and the Duty to Testify in a
Deportation Context
HENRY G. WATKINS*
Several recent legislative proposals have appeared, designed,
among other things, to streamline deportation proceedings. These
proposals have become entangled in the legislative and political
processes and have not, as yet, been enacted. This article outlines
a nonlegislative proposal to streamline many deportation cases.
The author addresses, in a deportation context, the invocation of
the right against self-incrimination and offers a proposal to grant
immunity from prosecution to persons in deportation proceedings,
thus triggering the "duty to testify." The author submits that this
proposal will eliminate many evidentiary and procedural problems
now common in deportation proceedings and will result in a sav-
ings of time and resources to all concerned.
INTRODUCTION
An order of deportability must be supported by clear, convincing
and unequivocal evidence.1 Traditionally, the Immigration and Nat-
* Immigration Judge, San Diego, California. The views expressed herein are the
author's and not necessarily those of the Executive Office of Immigration Review or the
Department of Justice. The author is a member of the Arizona Bar. He received his B.A.
in 1968, from Arizona State University; his J.D. in 1974, from Arizona State University
College of Law. Sincere appreciation is extended to Harriet E. Tucker, Esquire for her
support and inspiration.
1. 8 C.F.R. § 242.14(a)(1985); Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
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uralization Service (INS) has taken a variety of approaches in at-
tempting to meet this burden. For instance, on occasion the arresting
officers and those officers who interview the respondent after arrest
are called to testify. On other occasions the 1-213 "Record of De-
portable Alien ' 2 is offered into evidence. These and other approaches
are likely to result in numerous evidentiary and procedural objec-
tions by the respondent's attorney. If the immigration judge rules
incorrectly on these objections the case may be remanded and the
proceeding begun anew. 3 This prolongs an alien's illegal stay in the
country, and may result in eligibility for other relief.4 While a re-
quest for other relief may be denied, the alien's departure is delayed
while appeals are taken on this aspect of the case. Such delays in
deportation proceedings constitute a problem that has now been rec-
ognized by the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board).5
With increasing frequency in deportation proceedings, immigra-
tion judges must resolve claimed constitutional violations. However,
a claimed fourth amendment violation involving an illegal search or
seizure is not a basis for excluding testimony or other evidence ob-
tained in violation of that amendment. In Immigration and Natural-
ization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza," the Court held the exclusionary
rule does not apply to deportation proceedings, and reaffirmed the
following rule in deportation proceedings: "The 'body' or identity of
a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never
itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is con-
ceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation occurred."
While fourth amendment issues in a deportation context have
largely been eliminated, other thorny constitutional disputes remain. 8
These issues will be discussed below; however, the vast majority of
vice, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
2. The 1-213 is a standard investigative report used by INS to record informa-
tion concerning recently apprehended suspected undocumented aliens. It contains, among
other things, information concerning the apprehension of the aliens, biographical infor-
mation, prior immigration law violations, and the time, manner and place of last entry
into the United States.
3. See, e.g., Iran v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 656 F.2d 469 (9th
Cir. 1981).
4. E.g., suspension of deportation which generally requires seven continuous
years in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1982).
5. See In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70, 80 (BIA 1979).
6. 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984).
7. Id. at 3485. However, due process bars use in deportation proceedings of evi-
dence obtained by egregious conduct. In re Ramira-Cordova, No. A21095659 at 4 (BIA
Feb. 21, 1980) (nighttime warrantless entry of residence). Ramira-Cordova was cited
with approval in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S.Ct. 3479, n.5 at 3490 (1984).
8. For example, immigration judges still must face and resolve fifth amendment
due process issues. See In re Garcia, 17 I. & N. Dec. 319 (BIA 1980) (claimed involun-
tary or coerced statements). In re Carrillo, 17 I. & N. Dec. 30 (BIA 1979) (self-incrimi-
nation issues). See also In re Santos, Interim Dec. No. 2969 (BIA 1984) (involving
claimed violations of the respondent's right to counsel).
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these claims, as well as the above-mentioned problems can be elimi-
nated in most deportation cases by a new and relatively simple ap-
proach. This approach would allow immigration judges to devote less
time to those issues that do not relate to a respondent's deportability,
thus increasing the time they can devote to serious claims such as
asylum requests 9 and suspension of deportation claims.10
The Proposal
In deportation proceedings, the INS can ask a respondent ques-
tions concerning alienage or the right to be in the United States. It is
submitted that the respondent has an obligation to answer all nonin-
criminating questions, and his or her failure to comply supports a
finding that the respondent's wrongful refusal to answer is tanta-
mount to an admission.11
It is recognized, however, that many genuine and complicated self-
incrimination issues exist in current deportation proceedings which
often justify a respondent's refusal to answer. The author has been
unable to discover one instance where a respondent's answers in de-
portation proceedings have been used against the respondent in sub-
sequent criminal proceedings. 12 Accordingly, it is recommended that
the Attorney General promulgate a policy granting respondents in
deportation proceedings immunity from prosecution for immigration
law violations. Alternatively, immunity should be granted, at a mini-
mum, for the offenses of entry without inspection, 3 reentry after de-
portation,1 4 and failure to register as an alien.' 5 If the grant of im-
munity is limited to these three offenses, other types of immunity for
possible crimes, not involved in the typical deportation proceeding,
could be conferred as appropriate by the United States Attorney.
Immunization from prosecution obliges the respondent to answer
questions concerning alienage or any right to remain in the United
States. An adverse inference is properly drawn where a respondent
wrongfully refuses to answer. Significantly, such immunity obviates
the need of immigration judges, the INS, and respondents to address
these time-consuming and often difficult questions. Moreover, this
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982).
10. Id. at § 1254(a).
11. See infra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
12. But compare analysis in United States v. Alderete-Deras, 743 F.2d 645, (9th
Cir. 1984), infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1982). See infra note 41.
14. Id. at § 1326. See infra note 42.
15. Id. at §§ 1302, 1306. See infra note 51.
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grant of immunity requires no alteration of the government's de
facto policy of not using statements obtained in deportation proceed-
ing for subsequent prosecution of immigration law violations. The
formalization of this policy would eliminate many claimed constitu-
tional violations, as well as procedural and evidentiary problems.",
Reliance upon prior statements or other evidence obtained in alleged
violation of the fourth or fifth amendment, or the right to counsel
would no longer be required. Further, the procedures and evidence
employed in deportation matters would be simplified. As noted in
Lopez-Mendoza, even assuming an illegal arrest, search, or interro-
gation, no basis to object to deportation proceedings arises because a
respondent's body and identity are not suppressible. This fact, cou-
pled with the respondent's duty to answer nonincriminating ques-
tions, would result in simplified and efficient deportation procedure.
In summary, (1) the body and identity of respondents are never
suppressible even assuming an illegal search, arrest, or interrogation.
Assuming that evidence concerning alienage or deportability is un-
trustworthy or inadmissible for some other reason, independent evi-
dence may be introduced; (2) because respondents are obliged to an-
swer nonincriminating questions a proper grant of immunity requires
that respondents testify and that their admissions constitute indepen-
dent evidence to support findings of deportability; (3) in those few
cases where respondents refuse to testify after being granted immu-
nity, their silence is tantamount to an admission of questions regard-
ing alienage and deportability.
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
As the respondents in deportation proceedings have a duty to an-
swer nonincriminating questions, 17 it is appropriate to discuss the
privilege against self-incrimination in such proceedings. The fifth
amendment reads in pertinent part: "[n]o person . . . shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ...."18
The privilege against self-incrimination, however, applies in more
than the criminal context. 19 If the sovereign was able to compel in-
criminating testimony in a civil or administrative proceeding, and
then use that testimony in a subsequent criminal proceeding, the
privilege would be a cruel hoax. Thus, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that the privilege may be claimed in any proceeding, whether
criminal or civil, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudi-
16. See infra text following note 103.
17. See infra notes 110-33 and accompanying text.
18. U.S. Cowsr. amend. V.
19. The privilege applies only to testimonial or communicative incrimination and
not to the production of incriminating physical evidence. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433 (1974); United States v. Thompson, 475 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1973).
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catory.20 The exercise of this privilege in deportation proceedings has
been specifically recognized. 21
The privilege against self-incrimination is personal to the witness;
consequently, it may not be invoked to protect another. 22 It is the
witness' ultimate decision to claim or waive the privilege; it is not the
decision of the court,23 nor even of the witness' attorney.24 The wit-
ness is, however, entitled to the advice of counsel before deciding
whether to invoke the privilege.2 5 The trial judge has the discretion
to permit the witness' counsel to invoke the privilege on his behalf.26
The court should not require specific or legalistic words prior to
recognizing a respondent's invocation of the privilege. The Supreme
Court in Emspak v. United States27 has stated "no ritualistic
formula or talismanic phrase is essential to invoke the privilege
. . . .All that is necessary is an objection stated in language that
• . . may reasonably be expected [to be understood] as an attempt to
invoke the privilege. 28
In In re Sandoval,29 the Board noted that the immigration judge
continued to question a respondent concerning her alienage in the
face of her protestations that she would not "like to answer," and
with her attorney's explanation that this was an invocation of her
privilege against self-incrimination. The immigration judge ignored
this claim, later reasoning that the respondent had not "personally
and expressly" claimed the privilege. The Board reversed the immi-
gration judge, ruling that the privilege had been "fairly brought to
the attention of the tribunal," as was required in United States ex
20. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); see also Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S.
801, 805 (1977).
21. See, e.g., Wall v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 722 F.2d 1442
(9th Cir. 1984); Chavez-Raya v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 519 F.2d 397
(7th Cir. 1975); In re Carrillo, 17 I. & N. Dec. 30 (BIA 1979); In re R-, 4 I. & N. Dec.
720 (BIA 1952).
22. United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637, 649 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1008, 423 U.S. 840 (1975); United States v. Compton, 365 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 956 (1966); United States v. Ginsburg, 96 F.2d 882, 885 (7th Cir.
1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 620 (1938).
23. Ginsburg, 96 F.2d at 885.
24. Mayes, 512 F.2d at 649; United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280 (6th Cir.
1964).
25. Mayes, 512 F.2d at 649; Compton, 365 F.2d at 1; see also Sandoval, 17 I. &
N. Dec. at 72 n.1.
26. Mayes, 512 F.2d at 649.
27. 349 U.S. 190 (1955).
28. Id. at 194. See also United States v. Goodwin, 470 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 969 (1973); Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 72 n.1.
29. 17 I. & N. Dec. 70 (BIA 1979).
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rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration.3
In this type of situation, a serious question arises as to whether a
judge may disregard counsel's statement that the privilege is in-
voked. Since the privilege may be invoked only as to individual ques-
tions,31 a witness should be allowed to confer with counsel before
answering each possibly incriminating question. To meaningfully
recognize the right to counsel inherent in claiming the privilege, the
court should allow counsel to invoke the privilege if the witness so
desires, or permit the witness to confer with counsel before answer-
ing each possibly incriminating question. 32
Although a witness may not invoke the privilege against self-in-
crimination on behalf of another, the spousal testimonial privilege,
which applies in deportation proceedings, may justify the refusal to
answer certain questions in deportation proceedings.3 3 As a result,
when a married couple is involved in deportation proceedings, the
privilege against self-incrimination may not be circumvented by ask-
ing each spouse questions about the other.34
The right against self-incrimination does not, however, excuse a
witness in deportation or other civil proceedings from taking the
stand, being sworn, and having questions asked of him.35 Once on
the stand, the privilege cannot be invoked as a blanket refusal to
answer all questions. Rather, the witness may invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination only as to individual questions.3 6 The court
must then determine whether a refusal to answer a particular ques-
tion on these grounds is well-founded. 37 The "mere say-so" of a wit-
30. Id. at 72 n.1 (citing 273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927)).
31. See infra note 36, and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., the procedure used in Mayes, 512 F.2d at 637.
33. Garcia-Jaramillo v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 604 F.2d 1238
(9th Cir. 1979); Volianitis v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 352 F.2d 766 (9th
Cir. 1965); In re Yaldo, 12 I. & N. Dec. 830 (BIA 1968); In re B-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 738
(BIA 1954).
34. If the spousal testimonial privilege is not claimed at the hearing it is waived
and may not be raised on appeal. Garcia-Jaramillo, 604 F.2d at. 1238. The testifying
spouse alone may invoke or waive this privilege. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.
40 (1980) (through discussion of the spousal testimonial privilege). See also Pereira v.
United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954) (a divorce removes the basis of this privilege for most
purposes). If a prima facie showing is made that the marriage is a sham and without
substance, the privilege may not be claimed. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604
(1953); In re Yaldo, 12 I. & N. Dec. 830 (BIA 1968). Additionally, the privilege against
self-incrimination can generally be invoked, because if one spouse incriminates the other,
the testifying spouse would be incriminated as well.
35. United States v. Ponder, 475 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1973); General Dynamic
Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1162
(1974).
36. Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigation Commission, 406 U.S. 472 (1972); Gen-
eral Dynamic, 481 F.2d at 1204.
37. Zicarelli, 406 U.S. at 472; Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951);
Ponder, 475 F.2d at 237.
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ness that an answer would be incriminating is insufficient. 38 The
privilege may be claimed only where the witness shows how the an-
swer. might be used in criminal proceedings, or lead to other evidence
which might be so used. 39
To claim the privilege, it need not be shown that an answer would
directly support a conviction, but only that it would furnish a link in
the chain of evidence needed to prosecute.40 Hence, an answer ad-
mitting alienage, or leading to evidence of alienage is incriminating
where prosecution is possible for entry without inspection 41 or reen-
try after deportation. 42 Moreover, such an answer would be incrimi-
38. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486.
39. NLRB v. Trans Ocean Export Packing, Inc., 473 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1973);
Ponder, 475 F.2d at 37.
40. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); In re R-, 4 I. & N. Dec. at 720. For
example, alienage standing alone is not illegal; however, it is an essential element of an
illegal entry, 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1982), and of reentry after deportation, Id. at § 1326,
offenses. See United States v. Bejar-Matrecios, 618 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1980).
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1982) reads as follows:
Any alien who (1) enters the United States at any time or place other than as
designated by immigration officers, or (2) eludes examination or inspection by
immigration officers, or (3) obtains entry to the United States by a willfully
false or misleading representation or the willful concealment of a material fact,
shall, for the first commission of any such offenses, be guilty of a misdemeanor
and upon conviction thereof be punished by imprisonment for not more than
six months, or by a fine of not more than $500, or by both, and for a subse-
quent commission of any such offenses shall be guilty of a felony and upon
conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than two
years, or by a fine of not more than $5,000, or both.
Where a possibility of prosecution under this provision exists, an alien may invoke the
privilege to refuse to answer questions concerning alienage or any other incriminating
questions. Carillo, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 30. In this case, the respondent was charged in
deportation proceeding under section 1251(a)(2) (entry without inspection). However,
regardless of the charge in deportation proceedings, if there is a possibility of criminal
prosecution under section 1325 the privilege may be invoked. In re Martinez-Ramirez,
A23106531 - San Diego (BIA 1984).
Where no possibility of prosecution under section 1325 exists, e.g., where the alien
entered legally and overstayed his authorized time in the country, section 1325 cannot
provide a basis for invoking the privilege. Santos, Interim Dec. No. 2969 at 7 n.2. Santos
might be read as suggesting (at footnote 2) that failure to register as an alien is not an
offense for which the privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked.
42. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1982) reads as follows:
Any alien who (1) has been arrested and deported or excluded and deported,
and thereafter (2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the
United States, unless (A) prior to his reembarkation at a place outside the
United States or his application for admission from foreign contiguous terri-
tory, the Attorney General has expressly consented to such alien's reapplying
for admission; or (B) with respect to any alien previously excluded and de-
ported, unless such alien shall establish that he was not required to obtain such
advance consent under this or any prior Act, shall be guilty of a felony, and
upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment of not more than two
1081
nating where a failure to register as an alien charge43 is possible.
In assessing self-incrimination claims, the court must determine
whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and real dangers
of incrimination." The claimant may not refuse to answer harmless
questions. 45 There is no right to refuse to testify about a prior con-
viction or acquittal since no possibility of another criminal prosecu-
tion on those same facts exists. 46
Furthermore, the privilege cannot be invoked where criminal pros-
ecution is barred by a statute of limitations.47 A criminal prosecution
for entry without inspection is subject to a five year limitations pe-
riod.48 Consequently, the privilege against self-incrimination may not
be invoked for fear of prosecution for entry without inspection where
the entry occurred more than five years in the past.49 A reentry after
deportation is, however, a continuous violation, and the statute of
limitations does not run so long as the alien remains in the United
States.50 Since the willful failure or refusal to register as an alien in
years, or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or both.
8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1982).
This provision does not, however, support a self-incrimination claim where an alien
who has previously been deported, or excluded and deported obtains express consent for
admission, or does not require such consent because his prior deportation was more than
five years before his reentry, or his prior exclusion and deportation was more than one
year before his reentry. See id. at § 1182(a)(16),(17), amended by Pub. L. No. 97-116.
43. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1306 (1982). See infra note 51.
44. Zicarelli, 406 U.S. at 478; Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968);
Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1941).
45. Zicarelli, 406 U.S. at 472. See also United States v. Compton, 365 F.2d I
(6th Cir. 1966) (the privilege does not apply where a witness' name and address are
asked).
46. Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960); Wall v. Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service, 722 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984); In re R-, 4 I. & N. Dec. at 720.
47. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 598 (1896); United States v. Goodman, 289
F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1961); In re R-, 4 I. & N. Dec. at 722.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1982); Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 467 (9th Cir.
1983); United States v. Rincon-Jimenez, 595 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1979). The entry with-
out inspection offense occurs at the time of entry and no criminal prosecution may be
brought five years thereafter. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1982).
49. The Supreme Court, in Lopez-Mendoza, declined, however, to decide whether
a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325 is a continuing or completed crime following an illegal
entry. 104 S. Ct. at 3489 n.4. Thus, the above-cited cases continue to govern the limita-
tions period for 8 U.S.C. § 1325 prosecutions.
It should also be noted that a respondent in certain cases may claim the privilege
although the entry date alleged in the deportation proceeding is before the five year stat-
ute of limitations. This would be true in cases where there is a subsequent entry within
the five year period which exposes the respondent to prosecution.
50. United States v. Bruno, 328 F. Supp. 815 (W.D. Mo. 1971); United States v.
Alvarado-Soto, 120 F. Supp. 848 (S.D. Cal. 1954). Cf. Rincon-Jimenez, 595 F.2d at
1194, (dictum to the effect 8 U.S.C. § 1326 is a continuous violation). But see United
States v. Di Santillo, 615 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1980) (a § 1326 offense begins to run, for
the purposes of the five year statute of limitations of 18 U.S.C. § 3282, at the time of
reentry, if the alien enters through an official Immigration and Naturalization port of
entry, and immigration authorities have a record of the entry).
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violation of sections 1302 and 1306 of the United States Code51 is a
continuous offense, the statute of limitations does not commence if
the alien remains in the country. 2
These same sections 1302 and 130653 impose criminal penalties
for the willful failure or refusal to register as an alien within thirty
days of entering the United States.5 4 The duty to register is not trig-
gered, however, if an alien is in the United States thirty days or less.
Moreover, it must be proven that an alien in the country more than
thirty days "was fully aware he was an alien required to register and
be fingerprinted but purposefully and wrongfully refused to do so.'55
If an alien comes before an immigration court within thirty days
after entering the country, then there is no possibility of criminal
prosecution under the failure or refusal to register provisions. Fur-
thermore, it would seem that an alien apprehended within thirty
days after entry, and detained beyond the thirty day period, would
not face the possibility of prosecution for failure to register, because
incarceration prevents registration, and the failure to register cannot
be deemed "willful." It is questionable whether most aliens appre-
51. Section 1302 reads, in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be the duty of every alien now or hereafter in the United States, who (1) is
fourteen years of age or older, (2) has not been registered and fingerprinted under section
1201(b) of this title or section 30 or 31 of the Alien Registration Act, 1940, and (3)
remains in the United States for thirty days or longer, to apply for registration and to be
fingerprinted before the expiration of such thirty days. (b) It shall be the duty of every
parent or legal guardian of any alien now or hereafter in the United States, who ... is
less than fourteen years of age [to register the alien if (a)(2) and (a)(3) (above) apply.]
Whenever any alien attains his fourteenth birthday in the United States he shall, within
thirty days thereafter, apply in person for registration and to be fingerprinted.
8 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982).
Section 1306 reads, in pertinent part:
(a) Any alien required to apply for registration and to be fingerprinted in the
United States who willfully fails or refuses to make such application or to be
fingerprinted, and any parent or legal guardian required to apply for the regis-
tration of any alien who willfully fails or refuses to file application for the
registration of such alien shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, upon
conviction thereof, be fined not to exceed $1,000 or be imprisoned not more
than six months, or both.
Id. at § 1306.
52. United States v. Franklin, 188 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1951). See also Lopez-
Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. at 3489 n.3.
53. See supra note 51.
54. Justice O'Connor suggested in Lopez-Mendoza, at footnote 3, that the failure
to register "without more, constitutes a [continuing] crime." 104 S. Ct. at 3489 n.3. This
suggestion was not a direct holding of the Court and as Justice White pointed out in
dissent, it is simply wrong. Id. at 3493-94.
55. United States v. Zeid, 281 F.2d 825, 827 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 901
(1960); see also United States v. Ginn, 124 F. Supp. 658 (E.D. Pa. 1954), rev'd on other
grounds, 222 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1955).
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hended within thirty days of entry and released on bond, although
they remain in the United States beyond the thirty day period, may
be prosecuted under sections 1302 and 1306. If the aliens use their
true name, remain in contact with the INS and the court, and ap-
pear at all scheduled proceedings, absent an express demand to reg-
ister, it can hardly be said that they have "willfully" failed or re-
fused to register. Since their presence would be "registered" with the
INS and the immigration court, it would seem extremely difficult to
prove that such aliens had not registered. Accordingly, the better
view is that sections 1302 and 1306 do not provide a basis for the
invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Realistically, few illegal aliens know of their duty to register as
aliens; it will be the exception when "willfullness" can be proved.
Although prosecution under the registration provisions is unlikely,
the privilege against self-incrimination may be claimed in other
cases where no possibility of prosecution exists. This occurs because
the "possibility" rather than the "probability" of criminal prosecu-
tion is the test.56
The Congressional power to require alien registration has long
been settled.57 However, compelling an alien to testify concerning his
or her failure or refusal to register, or alienage, which is an essential
element of a registration violation, would violate the privilege against
self-incrimination unless no possibility of prosecution exists.58
Where a self-incrimination claim is erroneously rejected in a de-
portation proceeding, the answers must be stricken, and may not
support an order of deportation.59 Any fruits of the testimony must
also be suppressed.60
Since the privilege is solely for the benefit of the witness and is
56. Zicarelli, 406 U.S. at 472; Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 479. The court in United
States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206 (1st Cir. 1973), stated that "[n]either the practical
unlikelihood of further prosecution nor the Assistant United States Attorney's denial of
an intention to charge [the witness criminally] negated [the] privilege." Id. at 1209 n.2.
57. Davidowitz v. Hines, 30 F. Supp. 470 (M.D. Pa. 1939), affid, 312 U.S. 52
(1941); United States v. Sacco, 428 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903
(1970).
58. In Sacco, 428 F.2d at 271, the court noted that the alien registration statutes
are "essentially non-criminal" regulatory provisions, and held that requiring an alien to
register does not violate his right against self-incrimination. However, lest this decision
be misread, it merely held that the statutory requirement that aliens register cannot be
avoided by claiming that the statute is unconstitutional because it violates the privilege
against self-incrimination.
Sacco was a criminal prosecution and the defendant was indicted under the alien regis-
tration provisions. Thus, the court did not mean to suggest that a violation of the provi-
sions is not a crime. Rather, the court ruled that the duty to register is itself a regulatory
requirement, and thus did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination.
59. Valeros v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 387 F.2d 921 (7th Cir.
1967); Sandoval, 17 1. & N. Dec. at 70.
60. United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966).
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deemed waived unless invoked,"' it must be claimed or the testimony
is not "compelled" within the meaning of the fifth amendment. 2
Thus, if the privilege is not invoked, the testimony will not be sup-
pressed, unless coercion can be proved.6 3 Unless fairly brought to the
attention of the tribunal the privilege is waived;6 4 therefore, the priv-
ilege cannot be raised on appeal if it was not claimed with some
specificity before the trial court.6 5
Absent an applicable statute providing to the contrary, neither the
trial judge nor the prosecuting attorney is required to advise a wit-
ness of the privilege against self-incrimination. The Ninth Circuit
recently held in United States v. Alderete-Deras67 that there is no
duty to advise a respondent in a deportation hearing of the privilege.
After being informed of his right to be represented by an attorney,
to question witnesses, and to present a defense, the respondent ad-
mitted that he was a Mexican citizen who had entered the country
illegally, by avoiding border inspection, and was then deported. Sev-
eral years later, in a criminal prosecution for reentry after his depor-
tation, the district court, because of fifth amendment violations, sup-
pressed the fact that the respondent had been previously deported.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that there was no duty to advise
the respondent of his right to invoke the fifth amendment. The court
reasoned that the government in the criminal prosecution had not
sought to introduce the respondent's previous admissions, but only
that he had been deported. Further, the rights that normally attach
to a criminal prosecution do not apply in a deportation proceeding.
Accordingly, the immigration judge had no duty to counsel an un-
represented respondent concerning his fifth amendment rights .6
61. United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 148 (1931), (citing United States
ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927)).
62. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943).
63. United States v. Bloom, 450 F. Supp. 323, 336 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
64. Vajtauer, 273 U.S. at 113.
65. Id.
66. In United States v. Alderete-Deras, 743 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1984), the court
held that an immigration judge may require an unrepresented respondent to testify. The
judge has no duty to advise the respondent that he or she has a right to refuse to answer
incriminating questions. See also WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 396 (12th ed.
1975) and cases cited therein; In re R-, 4 I. & N. Dec. at 720; In re P-, 5 I. & N. Dec.
306 (BIA 1953).
67. 743 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1984).
68. While the court's conclusion is correct, another analysis is possible. If the
prosecution was for the original entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1325, the respondent could argue
that any violation of the privilege was harmful. If, however, a respondent was criminally
charged with the first illegal entry, he could raise the claim of violation of the privilege
because the privilege was allegedly violated regarding the completed act. On the other
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While a judge is not strictly prohibited from counseling the respon-
dent, the judge cannot claim the privilege against self-incrimination
for the witness.69
Self-Incrimination and Requests for Relief In Lieu of Deportation
It is not unusual for a respondent to contest alienage in the depor-
tation stage of the hearing, but admit alienage in the relief phase of
that same hearing. Evidently, because the respondent must be found
deportable before the immigration judge may consider requests for
relief in lieu of deportation, 0 the Board has held that evidence
presented during the relief phase of the hearing may not be consid-
ered on the issue of deportability.71 If the privilege is invoked in re-
questing relief in lieu of deportation, and the respondent fails to go
forward on key issues, the request will be denied because the respon-
dent bears the burden of demonstrating entitlement to such relief. 2
Voluntary departure or other discretionary relief may not be denied,
however, merely because the respondent properly invoked the privi-
lege and put the government to its burden of proof.7 3
Occassionally, a respondent will invoke the privilege in refusing to
admit deportability, but will effectively waive it in seeking relief in
lieu of deportation by stating facts that admit alienage or de-
portability. This should constitute a waiver of the privilege. Al-
though the basis for claiming the privilege is an alleged fear of po-
tential criminal prosecution, no true fear of prosecution exists once
alienage, immigration status, or other "incriminating" facts are ad-
mitted in any aspect of the deportation hearing. Accordingly, the
privilege should be waived regarding these admissions for all pur-
poses, including deportability.
hand, the simple answer to the respondent's claim that the privilege was violated in the
prior deportation hearing is that the privilege cannot be invoked as a shield from prose-
cution for future criminal conduct. At the time of the deportation hearing there was no
danger of a reentry after deportation charge since the reentry had not yet occurred. It
may be argued that the prior deportation provided a link in the chain of evidence neces-
sary to prove the reentry after deportation charge. However, the chain cannot extend to
possible future conduct. This becomes clear if it is assumed that the respondent at the
earlier deportation hearing was granted immunity from prosecution on the illegal entry
charge. He nevertheless could be prosecuted for reentry after deportation. Thus, the re-
sult would be identical whether the respondent in the prior proceeding was granted im-
munity or had his right to invoke the privilege violated. In sum, no prejudice can be
shown from the failure to advise respondent of the privilege in the deportation hearing.
69. Ginsburg, 96 F.2d at 882.
70. The most common requested relief is that a respondent be allowed to depart
the country voluntarily in lieu of deportation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1982).
71. In re Bulos, 15 I. & N. Dec. 645 (BIA 1976).
72. Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 U.S. 405 (1960); In re Marques, 16 I. & N. Dec.
314 (BIA 1977); In re Marques, 15 I. & N. Dec. 200 (BIA 1975).
73. In re Tsang, 14 I. & N. Dec. 294, 296 (1973).
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The Board set forth a contrary rule in In re Bulos.74 The respon-
dent invoked the privilege and refused to testify concerning his de-
portability, while testifying in support of his application for volun-
tary departure. The immigration judge indicated that unless the
respondent testified as to the manner that he entered the country,
voluntary departure would not be possible. The respondent then tes-
tified that he had entered without inspection. Relying in part on this
testimony, the immigration judge found the respondent deportable.
The Board ruled that the judge erred, and noted that, "under 8
C.F.R. 242.17(d) [now 8 C.F.R. 242.17(e)] an application for volun-
tary departure shall not be held to constitute a concession of alienage
or deportability in any case in which the respondent does not admit
his alienage or deportability. '7  The Board then went on to explain:
[t]here appears to be a misconception concerning the scope of the testimony
of a respondent who is applying for the privilege of voluntary departure.
Such testimony is given for the purpose of ascertaining whether the respon-
dent is eligible for, and deserves a grant of, that privilege .... The testi-
mony of a respondent in connection with his application for the privilege of
voluntary departure may or may not touch upon alienage and deportability.
In any case, such testimony must not be used for the purpose of either
establishing or confirming his alienage or deportability.76
The Board's conclusion in Bulos could have been supported on the
ground that the immigration judge improperly ruled that voluntary
departure was not possible absent an admission of the illegal entry,
which is not an essential condition to a grant of voluntary departure.
As the Board in Bulos stated, a respondent's testimony in support of
an application for voluntary departure "may or may not touch upon
alienage and deportability. '77 Only when a respondent invokes the
privilege against self-incrimination in failing to go forward on key
issues may voluntary departure be denied.78 Thus, the Board in
Bulos could have held that the respondent's testimony concerning his
illegal entry was coerced under the rule of Valeros v. Immigration
and Naturalization Service,79 and In re Sandoval, ° and thus should
be stricken.
74. 15 I. & N. Dec. 645 (BIA 1976). Whatever the soundness of the BIA's anal-
ysis in Bulos, it constitutes binding precedent for immigration judges. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g)
(1985).
75. Bulos, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 648.
76. Id. See also Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 84, (citing Bulos, 15 I. & N. Dec.
at 645).
77. Bulos, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 648.
78. Marques, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 314; Marques, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 200.
79. 387 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1967).
80. 17 I. & N. Dec. 70 (BIA 1979).
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The privilege, however, does not apply to noncompelled incrimi-
nating statements. The privilege may not be invoked for one purpose
and waived for another in the same proceeding. Indeed, the Board
itself has recognized that, "where a witness has once given testimony
voluntarily it may afterwards be used against him in the same depor-
tation proceedings, and he may not claim the privilege of self-incrim-
ination as to such testimony." '81
The basis for the privilege against self-incrimination is that the
witness fears having incriminating statements used in a subsequent
criminal prosecution. Nothing bars, however, a criminal prosecution
based on incriminating statements, where those statements are made
to obtain the benefit of relief in lieu of deportation. 2 This should be
fatal to the original invocation of the privilege, since the respondent
has shown no real fear of prosecution. Moreover, even assuming that
the respondent feared a subsequent criminal prosecution, the privi-
lege would be waived with respect to any prior voluntary testimony.
The meaning of 8 C.F.R. Section 242.17(e) is not the pertinent
inquiry in this context; rather, the issue is in what circumstances the
privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked. Where no basis
to invoke the privilege exists, or where it is waived, it simply may not
be used to bar admissions of alienage or deportability.
81. In re P-, 5 I. & N. Dec. at 307. In In re R-, 4 1. & N. Dec. at 720, the Board
stated, "where a witness has once given testimony voluntarily, it may afterward be used
against him in the same or other proceedings and he may not claim the privilege of self-
incrimination as to such testimony" (citation omitted, emphasis added). Id. at 721-22.
It has been stated that the waiver of the privilege at one stage of a proceeding does not
constitute a waiver for future stages. United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460,
464 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1005 (1978). This rule does not, however,
undermine what has been said above. Rather, it pertains to the rule, in some jurisdic-
tions, that once an individual elects to partially waive the privilege and discloses his crim-
inal connection, he is not permitted to stop but must make a full disclosure. Trejo-Zam-
brano, and the cases it cites, hold that the privilege is not waived for other possibly
incriminating testimony because it has been waived for some purposes. These cases stress
that a witness' further testimony may result in additional criminal liability. See also
United States v. Burch, 490 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 990
(1974); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1209 (1st Cir. 1973) (the privilege,
however, is lost for testimony already given).
82. Even if 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(e) was properly construed as barring admissions of
alienage and deportability, in a voluntary departure application, to support an order of
deportation, the privilege would be waived by the witness' incriminating statements. On
its face, 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(e) does not require the result reached in Bulos. By providing
that "an application for voluntary departure" shall not constitute a concession of alien-
age or deportability, it seems merely to allow pleading in the alternative. That is, it
permits an alien to deny deportability, but apply for voluntary departure if deportability
is found. Thus, the mere fact that such an application is made does not concede alienage
or deportability. The facts set forth in connection with such an application, are not by the
plain language of section 242.17(e), insulated from consideration regarding alienage or
deportability. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(e) (1985).
While in other contexts there may be reasons to construe section 242.17(e) as the
Board did in Bulos, no fifth amendment argument or other justification exists where the
privilege against self-incrimination is involved.
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IMMUNITY FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
A grant of immunity from criminal prosecution eliminates the
need for the privilege against self-incrimination because no possibil-
ity of prosecution exists. 83 When immunity from prosecution is
granted "a witness once again owes the obligation imposed upon all
[witnesses] - the duty to give testimony - since immunity substi-
tutes for the privilege.1 84
To displace the privilege against self-incrimination, the grant of
immunity must be fully co-extensive with the privilege.8 5 In other
words, before a grant of immunity "substitute[s] for the privilege" it
must immunize the witness from the possibility of criminal prosecu-
tion on the basis of the testimony. Immunity from prosecution for
one crime does not require the witness to answer incriminating ques-
tions if there is a possibility of prosecution under another statute.88
Several provisions of Title 18 provide for "use" immunity.87 Use
immunity guarantees that neither a witness' answers nor the fruits
thereof will be used against him in a criminal prosecution. The wit-
ness is not protected, however, from criminal prosecution based on
evidence gathered independently of the witness' testimony. On the
other hand, "transactional" immunity ensures that the witness will
not be prosecuted for the transaction or incident about which he is
called upon to give testimony.88 Either form of immunity displaces
the privilege against self-incrimination. 9
The failure to use the statutory mechanism of the federal immu-
nity statute does not render an immunity agreement unlawful.90 For
example, an immunity agreement, although not reduced to writing
or signed by the witness, remains valid.91
83. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976); Ullmann v. United States,
350 U.S. 422 (1956).
84. Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 576.
85. Reina, 364 U.S. at 507.
86. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); United States v. Johnson,
488 F.2d 1206, 1209 (1st Cir. 1973).
The power to grant immunity from prosecution is the sole prerogative of the Attorney
General or his designees. United States v. Graham, 548 F.2d 1302, 1315 (8th Cir. 1977);
United States v. McBride, 571 F. Supp. 596 (S.D. Tex. 1983). Neither the immigration
judge nor the INS is empowered to grant immunity. Carrillo, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 30; In
re King and Yang, 16 I. & N. Dec. 502 (BIA 1978); In re Exantus and Pierre, 16 I. &
N. Dec. 382 (BIA 1977).
87. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001 - 05 (1982); Tierney, 409 U.S. at 1232.
88. See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453.
89. Tierney, 409 U.S. at 1232.
90. United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120 (1st Cir. 1981).
91. Id.
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An immunity grant must be co-extensive with the privilege before
the witness is obliged to give testimony. In deportation proceedings a
grant of immunity must, therefore, immunize the recipient against
all possible criminal prosecutions which may be brought as a result
of the witness' testimony. 2 A grant of immunity from prosecution
under section 1325 is not co-extensive with the privilege, if a possi-
bility of prosecution under the alien registration provisions exists.93
If there is a possibility of criminal prosecution in more than one ju-
risdiction, a grant of immunity from less than all jurisdictions is not
considered co-extensive with the privilege. 94
In United States v. Carter,95 the court held that a promise of im-
munity, made by the United States Attorney in the District of Co-
lumbia, could not be breached by the United States Attorney in the
Eastern District of Virginia. The court reasoned that if a problem
arises between the districts of the various United States Attorneys,
"the solution lies in the administrative controls which the Attorney
General of the United States may promulgate to regulate and con-
trol the conduct of cases by the United States Attorneys and their
assistants."9 6 The court observed that the honor of the government
and public confidence in the fair and efficient administration of jus-
tice were at stake. Accordingly, the immunity agreement was ruled
enforceable outside of the district in which it was made.97 Carter has
been cited by many courts with apparent approval.9 8 Hence, it ap-
pears reasonable to give express assurances to a witness that the im-
munity grant applies in other districts where a criminal prosecution
92, A grant of immunity, however, does not protect the witness from prosecution
for perjury if the immunized testimony is intentionally false. Mandujano, 425 U.S. at
564. See also 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982). Where a witness intentionally gives false testi-
mony, fails to give testimony after a grant of immunity, or otherwise fails to carry out his
duty to testify, the agreement not to prosecute is not binding on the government. United
States v. Nathan, 476 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 823 (1973), reh'g
denied, 414 U.S. 1086 (1973).
93. Johnson, 448 F.2d at 1209-10. See also supra notes 33-43 and accompanying
text.
94. See United States v. Lieber, 473 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. N.Y. 1979), which states
the general rule that a promise of immunity made by a United States Attorney in one
district cannot bind a United States Attorney in another district. The court noted that
the authority of a United States Attorney is limited to matters arising within the district
to which he is assigned. See 28 U.S.C. § 547 (1982). The court in Lieber ruled, however,
that an exception to this rule should be made where the United States Attorney making
the promise of immunity had discussed the grant of immunity with the Internal Revenue
Service and Justice Department officials (the Tax Division) and led the defendants to
believe he was acting on behalf of the government. Lieber, 473 F. Supp. at 892.
95. 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 933 (1972).
96. Id. at 428.
97. See also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (concerning the en-
forceability of immunity agreements).
98. Johnson v. Mabry, 707 F.2d 323, 330 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325, 1337 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Stevens, 601
F.2d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1979); McBride, 571 F. Supp. at 617.
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may be brought."
Section 132910 of Title 8 provides that jurisdiction over civil and
criminal actions under the immigration laws is in the district where
the violation occurred or, in section 1325 and 1326 prosecutions,
where the alien was apprehended. Thus, violations of the latter sec-
tions may be brought in either district.10' Consequently, an alien
who makes an illegal entry in one district and is apprehended in an-
other may demand immunity from prosecution in both, before other-
wise incriminating testimony may be compelled. This requires either
coordination between the offices of the United States Attorneys for
various districts, or a uniform policy statement issued by the Attor-
ney General regarding these provisions.
Immunity From Prosecutions For Statements Made in
Deportation Proceedings
Occasionally, the government institutes a criminal prosecution of
an alien for illegal entry or reentry after deportation. Generally these
prosecutions occur prior to a deportation proceeding. Once a depor-
tation proceeding is commenced, the aim of the government is to
have the alien removed from the United States. The vast majority of
aliens in these proceedings have violated sections 1325 and 1326, as
well as the alien registration provisions. It is common knowledge,
however, that if no criminal prosecution has been initiated prior to a
deportation proceeding, none will be brought.0 2 But, since the gov-
ernment has the power to bring these charges, the "possibility" of
prosecution remains, thus triggering the privilege against self-
incrimination.
The privilege complicates deportation proceedings by requiring in-
dependent evidence.103 Procedural and evidentiary problems abound,
decisions regarding the privilege itself may be overruled on appeal,
and the case remanded for a new hearing. These problems are sim-
ply unnecessary. A proper grant of immunity in these cases elimi-
99. See United States v. Alessi, 544 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 960 (1976); United States v. Boulier, 359 F. Supp. 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), affd on
other grounds, United States v. Nathan, 476 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1973).
100. 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (1982).
101. United States v. Mount Fuji Japanese Steak House, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 1194,
1201 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
102. The INS stated that it will not present such cases for prosecution because it
believes that the United States Attorney's position is that they do not warrant prosecu-
tion. In re Carrillo, 17 I. & N. Dec. 30, 33 (BIA 1979).
103. For example, border patrol agents and other immigration officials are called
from their duties to testify.
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nates both self-incrimination problems and those noted above. At the
same time, the immunity grant would be nothing more than a for-
malization of existing policy to not prosecute criminally the above-
referenced violations, as a result of testimony given in deportation
proceedings. It would be preferable for the United States Attorney
General to issue a blanket immunization from prosecution for immi-
gration law violations in these cases, which would eliminate the
problems arising from coordination between districts on immunity
grants.
If for policy reasons the Attorney General wishes to limit immu-
nity grants to prosecutions under sections 1325, 1326, or 1302 and
1306, in cases where other criminal violations are possible, the INS
may seek further grants of immunity where appropriate.
Self-Incrimination Violations Should Be Mooted By A
Subsequent Grant Of Immunity
Where an immigration judge wrongfully orders a witness to testify
in violation of the privilege against self-incrimination, the testimony
must be stricken and may not support a deportation order.104 But
where a subsequent grant of immunity is conferred, mooting the re-
spondent's self-incrimination concerns, the error in ordering the tes-
timony over valid objection should be cured. Hence, the earlier testi-
mony should not be barred from consideration in connection with the
respondent's alienage and deportability. This result is supported by a
recent Supreme Court case,10 5 where the Court ruled that although
evidence may have been obtained in violation of the right to counsel,
the error is harmless if the evidence would have been inevitably dis-
covered despite the violation. Since the grant of immunity moots the
self-incrimination claim, no prejudice remains because the respon-
dent has a duty to answer nonincriminating questions. The Board
has ruled that no prejudice results from evidence introduced in viola-
tion of the right to counsel, where the respondent complied with his
duty to answer nonincriminating questions.10 6
Similarly, where answers are rendered nonincriminatory by a sub-
sequent grant of immunity, the respondent suffers no prejudice. A
contrary result would exalt form over substance, and require a re-
mand so that the respondent could repeat the previous answers.
Thils, appropriate grants of immunity, issued after a deportation
proceeding, should moot self-incrimination claims, rendering admis-
sible any previous incriminating statements.
104. Valeros v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 387 F.2d 921 (7th Cir.
1967); Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 70.
105. Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984).
106. In Re Santos, Interim. Dec. No. 2969 (BIA 1984).
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For the same reasons as set forth above and discussed in San-
tos, 10 7 a grant of immunity can render moot any claimed violations
of the right to counsel, as well as fifth amendment claims of involun-
tary or coerced statements.108 First, as reaffirmed in Lopez-Men-
doza,10 9 even assuming an illegal search, arrest, or interrogation,
neither the body nor the identity of the respondent is suppressible.
Second, if immunity from prosecution is granted, the respondent has
a duty to answer questions concerning alienage and deportability.
The respondent's responses to these questions will usually admit
alienage and deportability; however, even if there is a wrongful re-
fusal to answer, a respondent's silence may support an order of
deportability." 0
Thus, where immunity from prosecution is granted, a respondent
must answer all questions concerning alienage and deportability.
This will substantially reduce the myriad constitutional, procedural,
and evidentiary problems in deportation proceedings. The Supreme
Court in Lopez-Mendoza eliminated fourth amendment issues in de-
portation proceedings. Additionally, the Attorney General or the va-
rious United States Attorneys can all but eliminate the fifth amend-
ment issues, right to counsel claims, and many procedural and
evidentiary problems in deportation proceedings by following the ap-
proach outlined above.
FAILURE TO ANSWER NONINCRIMINATING QUESTIONS
CONCERNING ALIENAGE SUPPORTS AN ORDER OF DEPORTABILITY
In most cases where there is no colorable fifth amendment claim,
respondent's counsel will direct the respondent to testify. In the vast
majority of cases, the respondent's testimony will prove deportability
and the remaining issue will be relief in lieu of deportation. Gener-
ally a respondent declines to testify only on the advice of counsel.
Accordingly, if immunity is granted, the respondent has a duty to
answer all questions because no basis to refuse to testify exists.
Counsel is then obliged to modify any previous inconsistent advice
and instruct the client to testify."'
107. See id. and accompanying text.
108. See In re Garcia, 17 I. & N. Dec. 319 (BIA 1980).
109. 104 S. Ct. at 3479. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 112-35 and accompanying text.
111. If respondent's counsel wrongfully refuses to do this, suspension by the Board
from further practice before the immigration courts and the Board may be imposed.
Section 292.3(a) of 8 C.F.R. states that the Board may bar or suspend from further
practice an attorney or representative whose conduct, inter alia, would constitute contu-
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In most cases, after a proper grant of immunity is conferred, the
respondent will admit alienage and concede deportability. If a re-
spondent improperly refuses to answer questions after being granted
immunity, deportability will not be difficult to establish. First, evi-
dence usually exists concerning the respondent's alienage or de-
portability or the respondent would not be involved in deportation
proceedings. Where this evidence is documentary, and relates to the
respondent, failure to testify concerning the accuracy or authenticity
of it should operate to waive any objections to its admissibility.112
Second, since the Supreme Court in Lopez-Mendoza ruled that
the exclusionary rule does not apply in deportation proceedings, evi-
dence allegedly obtained in violation of the fourth amendment is ad-
missible and may prove deportability. As the Court noted, allowing
such evidence to be admitted in deportation proceedings is not meant
to sanction improper conduct by police or immigration officers.
There may be remedies to address such conduct; the exclusionary
rule, however, is not one of them.
It has long been a rule of evidence that a party to a case who fails
to respond to assertions made in his presence, which if untrue should
be denied, will be deemed to have made an admission. 113 This rule
applies even though the person has no duty to speak and the unre-
futed statement is made out of court. Thus, it is all the more reason-
able to view as an admission the improper refusal to answer a ques-
tion that one has a legal duty to answer, and which one is uniquely
qualified to answer. Both the Supreme Court and the Board have
recently provided a strong indication that a respondent's refusal to
answer nonincriminating questions about alienage is tantamount to
an admission of alienage, which can support an order of
deportation.11 4
Respondents in deportation proceedings have a duty to answer
questions put to them, or suffer an adverse inference from their si-
lence."" In In re Santos,"6 the Board agreed with this proposition
macious conduct or contempt before a court with contempt power. 8 C.F.R. '§ 292.3(a)
(1985). See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975) (attorney's duties to cooperate with
the court in its rulings on self-incrimination claims).
112. Iran v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 656 F.2d 469, 471 n.4 (9th
Cir. 1981).
113. See United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979); see generally 4 WIGMORE. EVIDENCE § 1071 (Chadbourn
Rev. 1972).
114. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. at 3479; Santos, Interim Dec. No. 2969.
115. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Td, 263 U.S. 149, at 153-54 (1923). See
also Vajtauer, 273 U.S. at 110-11; Chavez-Raya v. Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice, 519 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1975); Laqui v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
422 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1967). See Zicarelli, 406 U.S. at 472 (rule applies in other civil
proceedings as well as deportation proceedings).
116. Interim Dec. No. 2969 (BIA 1984).
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stating:
Moreover, once the respondent was placed under oath at his deportation
hearing, he had no right to remain silent to nonincriminating questions...
and he was under an obligation to answer any questions truthfully or suffer
the adverse inferences that could be drawn from his silence. 117
This was not the first time the Board has recognized a respondent's
duty to answer nonincriminating questions or suffer the adverse in-
ference drawn from his silence.' 18
The Supreme Court in Lopez-Mendoza strongly suggested that
alienage may be proven by a respondent's failure to answer a nonin-
criminating question concerning alienage. In explaining why the ex-
clusionary rule does not apply in deportation proceedings, the Court
stated that the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule in such pro-
ceedings is not sufficient to justify its application. The Court noted:
As the BIA has recognized, in many deportation proceedings "the sole mat-
ters necessary for the government to establish are the respondent's identity
and alienage - at which point the burden shifts to the respondent to prove
the time, place and manner of entry." In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec., at
79. Since the person and identity of the respondent are not themselves sup-
pressible ... the INS must prove only alienage, and that will sometimes
be possible using evidence gathered independently of, or sufficiently atten-
tuated from, the original arrest. . . . The INS's task is simplified in this
regard by the civil nature of the proceeding.119
The Court then explained that proving alienage was "simplified"
because United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod,120 held that it is
proper to draw an adverse inference from a respondent's refusal to
answer questions. The court quoted from Bilokumsky as follows:
Silence is often evidence of the most persuasive character .... [TIhere is
no rule of law which prohibits officers charged with the administration of
the immigration law from drawing an inference from the silence of one who
is called upon to speak .... A person arrested on the preliminary warrant
is not protected by a presumption of citizenship comparable to the presump-
tidn of innocence in a criminal case. There is no provision which forbids
drawing an adverse inference from the fact of standing mute.1
2 1
Thus, the Court seemingly sanctioned a finding of alienage based
upon a respondent's refusal to answer nonincriminating questions.
The Board appeared to implicitly reach this same conclusion in In
117. Id. In essence, a failure to answer a nonincrimating question results in an
adverse inference. The Board cited Vajtauer, 273 U.S. at 110; Bilokumsky, 263 U.S. at
154; Chavez-Raya, 519 F.2d at 401.
118. See, e.g., In re Davilla, 15 I. & N. Dec. 781 (BIA 1976).
119. 104 S. Ct. at 3487 (emphasis added).
120. 263 U.S. at 153-54.
121. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. at 3487 (citing Bilokumsky, 263 U.S. at 153-54).
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re Santos.122 In Santos, the respondent appealed to the Board for a
reversal of an order of deportation on the charge that respondent was
an alien overstay. 123 Respondent's appeal claimed that he was denied
an adequate opportunity to obtain counsel, and was thereby deprived
of due process. The respondent's appeal was, however, rejected for
two reasons. First, it was held that the respondent voluntarily and
knowingly waived his right to counsel. Second, the Board stated that
even if the respondent had been denied his right to counsel, he could
demonstrate no prejudice and, therefore, his appeal must fail. In its
analysis, the Board cited considerable authority to support the pro-
position that a denial of the right to counsel is not error per se.'24
The Board then observed that since the respondent had a duty to
answer nonincriminating questions, he had an obligation to answer
questions regarding his remaining in the United States longer than
authorized, or suffer an adverse inference from failure to do so.
Based on this obligation, the Board held that the respondent was not
harmed by the lack of counsel. Accepting the Board's conclusion
that Santos was not prejudiced by the lack of an attorney, it follows
that respondents who have the benefit of counsel would be no worse
off if they failed to answer nonincriminating questions. However, if
respondents, after conferring with counsel, learn that they may not
be deported solely on the adverse inference of their silence, they
would be in a better position than the respondent in Santos. In San-
tos, the respondent was found deportable on the basis of his state-
ments; but if respondents who improperly refuse to answer nonin-
criminating questions could require the government to come forward
with other evidence, they would be in a better position than the San-
tos respondent.
122. Interim Dec. No. 2969 (BIA 1984).
123. An alien overstay is a nonimmigrant visitor who remains in the United States
longer than authorized. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(1982).
124. The Board did not refer to a decision which the author believes bolsters its
conclusion. In Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984), the Supreme Court held that
evidence obtained in violation of the right to counsel is not suppressible, if it would have
been inevitably discovered. The Court has therefore embraced a harmless error rule in
cases claiming violation of the right to counsel. This may prove significant since the
Board opined that the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuit Courts of Appeals still
held the view that the violation of the right to counsel is a fundamental error requiring
reversal. Santos, Interim Dec. No. 2969 at 6. Nix casts serious doubt on the "fundamen-
tal error" view. The Court in Nix reasoned:
However, if the government can prove that this evidence would have been ob-
tained inevitably and, therefore, would have been admitted regardless of any
overreaching by the police, there is no rational basis to keep that evidence from
the jury in order to ensure the fairness of the trial proceedings. In that situa-
tion the State has gained no advantage at trial and the defendant has suffered
no prejudice. Indeed, suppression of the evidence would operate to undermine
the adversary system by putting the State in a worse position than it would
have occupied without any police misconduct.
Nix, 104 S. Ct. at 2511 (emphasis in the original).
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Therefore, reading Santos as holding that no prejudice befalls a
respondent speaking without the benefit of counsel, it follows that
the adverse inference drawn from a failure to answer nonincriminat-
ing questions concerning alien status is tantamount to an admission.
Although a respondent who improperly refuses to testify may be
compelled by a federal district court to answer under pain of con-
tempt,12 5 the Court in Bilokumsky stated that no requirement exists
prior to drawing the adverse inference regarding the respondent's si-
lence.1 28 Viewed in this light, a respondent's refusal to answer nonin-
criminating questions should support a finding of deportability. 127
Further, because respondents have a duty to answer nonincrimi-
nating questions in deportation proceedings, it does not seem unfair
or unwarranted to enforce that duty by considering refusals to an-
swer questions regarding their immigration status as admissions. To
hold otherwise is to render this "duty" illusory. This conclusion ap-
pears to be supported by the Lopez-Mendoza and Santos decisions,
as well as by the cases cited in them.1 28
Arguably, the approach outlined above is not legally permissible in
light of Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy.1 29 A close reading of that
decision demonstrates, however, that it erects no bar to finding de-
portability based on a respondent's refusal to answer nonincriminat-
ing questions about alienage or immigration status. In Gastelum-
Quinones, the INS sought to divest the respondent of his lawful per-
manent resident status which he had enjoyed for forty years. The
125. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (1982).
126. Bilokumsky, 263 U.S. at 153-54. A refusal to answer, in the face of a con-
tempt order, would subject the respondents to detention and a possible fine. Some respon-
dents, however, have already been detained and are without funds; therefore, to refuse an
adverse inference in this situation would merely add to the overcrowding in federal de-
tention facilities. Meanwhile, the respondent who admitted alienage after being wrong-
fully deprived of counsel would be subject to deportation.
127. The Board in Santos opined that questions concerning an alien overstay, as
distinguished from an illegal entry, implicated no crime. On this basis, the Board con-
cluded respondent had no basis to assert his fifth amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination. However, as discussed below, this conclusion is doubtful at best, given the
criminal sanctions which attach to nonregistration by an alien. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1302 and
1306 (1982). See also Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. at 3488-89 (Justice O'Connor's asser-
tion that an alien's willful failure or refusal to register is a continuing crime).
128. The Ninth Circuit, in Iran, 656 F.2d at 469, ruled a document inadmissible
because it was not properly authenticated. The court declined to rule on whether the
respondent's refusal to testify concerning that document resulted in an adverse inference,
justifying its admission because the Board did not rely on this argument. Id. at 471 n.4.
This decision is interesting in that the court left the door open to an adverse inference
approach to circumvent the maze of procedural and evidentiary rules.
129. 374 U.S. 469 (1963).
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charge was that the respondent had, during some remote period,
meaningfully associated with the Communist Party by attending
party meetings and paying dues. The government called witnesses to
testify regarding this charge but did not call the respondent. 130 The
government argued that because its witnesses testified to the respon-
dent's past attendance at Communist Party meetings and to his pay-
ing dues to that party, the burden shifted to respondent to refute
these claimed showings of meaningful association. The Court noted
that the respondent had resided in the United States since 1920,
when he had immigrated from Mexico as a ten-year old boy, and
that he had raised and supported a family, all of whom were Ameri-
can citizens. The Court then observed that "deportation is a drastic
sanction . . . which can destroy lives and disrupt families . . . .
and concluded that deportability must therefore be premised upon
evidence of "meaningful association" more directly probative than a
mere inference based on the alien's silence. 31
Even accepting Gastelum-Quinones as good law, the case does not
undermine the approach suggested by the recent case law and Board
decision discussed above. First, the respondent was not called to tes-
tify and had no questions put to him; thus, no duty to testify arose.
Second, the holding of the Court does not address the issue of
whether the facts of past Communist Party dues paying and attend-
ance were established, because the Court seemed to accept these
facts as true. Rather, the Court held that the legal conclusion of
"meaningful association" was not supportable by an inference drawn
from the respondent's failure to rebut the testimony of the witnesses.
In sum, the government's case turned on whether its witnesses' testi-
mony supported a finding of "meaningful association." The Court
held that it did not. 32 Accordingly, a respondent's refusal to answer
130. It is not clear why the respondent was not called as a witness. Moreover, it is
not clear whether he could have invoked the privilege against self-incrimination if he
were called. The court did not address these issues.
131. Gastelum-Quinones, 374 U.S. at 479.
132. While we need not catalogue every factor distinguishing Gastelum-Quinones
from Bilokumsky and its progeny, it should be noted that the latter cases address nonin-
criminatory questions concerning alienage or immigration status. Gastelum-Quinones,
however, involved a legal conclusion, not "facts" relating to alienage or immigration sta-
tus. Additionally, Gastelum-Quinones involved a lawful permanent resident whose rights
have been held to be greater than those of other aliens in matters of evidence and bur-
dens of proof. For example, an alien seeking admission into the United States bears the
burden of showing admissibility. In re De La Nues, 18 1. & N. Dec. 140 (BIA 1981).
Once a prima facie showing is made that the alien is a returning lawful permanent resi-
dent, however, the burden shifts to the government to justify exclusion. Chew v. Rogers,
257 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1958); In re Mincheff, 13 I. & N. Dec. 715 (BIA 1971).
Some courts have intimated, in dicta, that inferences drawn from a respondent's si-
lence may not be sufficient to sustain a finding of deportability by clear, convincing and
unequivocal evidence. See, e.g., Paointhara v. INS, 708 F.2d 472, 474 (9th Cir. 1983)
reh'g denied 721 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1983); Sint v. INS, 500 F.2d 120 n.1 at 123 (1st
Cir. 1974). However, this issue seems to have been put to rest by Lopez-Mendoza, 104
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nonincriminating questions regarding his alienage or immigration
status would support an order of deportability.
CONCLUSION
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, addressing the issue of
privilege against self-incrimination in deportation proceedings can
prove to be a complex and time-consuming matter. Especially where
delay is the only defense or strategy available to a respondent, the
invocation of this privilege occurs with increasing frequency. This
stratagem can be eliminated easily by a proper grant of immunity.
Such an immunity grant would serve to not only eliminate self-in-
crimination claims, but also to eliminate many constitutional and
other claims, as well as procedural and evidentiary problems. This
simplified approach is possible for the following reasons:
(1) A respondent's body and identity are never suppressible even as-
suming an illegal search, arrest, or interrogation.
(2) A respondent must answer nonincriminating questions. There-
fore, a proper grant of immunity requires the respondent to testify,
and such testimony constitutes independent evidence that supports a
finding of deportability.
(3) If a respondent refuses to testify after being granted immunity, it
is tantamount to an admission on questions regarding alienage and
deportability.
The implementation of a formal immunity policy should be under-
taken by the Attorney General. Such a policy would formalize what
is in fact a longstanding practice of not prosecuting respondents for
immigration law violations discovered as a result of statements made
in deportation proceedings. Moreover, this formalization and the re-
sulting duty on respondents to answer nonincriminating questions
would streamline and simplify deportation proceedings, reduce to a
minimum the need to call immigration officers into court from their
other duties to give testimony, and provide formal assurances to re-
spondents that their constitutional right against self-incrimination
will be honored.
S.Ct. at 3479.
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